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Abstract
Carnap suggests that philosophy can be construed as being engaged
solely in conceptual engineering. I argue that since many results of the sci-
ences can be construed as stemming from conceptual engineering as well,
Carnap’s account of philosophy can be methodologically naturalistic. This
is also how he conceived of his account. That the sciences can be construed
as relying heavily on conceptual engineering is supported by empirical in-
vestigations into scientific methodology, but also by a number of concep-
tual considerations. I present a new conceptual consideration that gener-
alizes Carnap’s conditions of adequacy for analytic-synthetic distinctions
and thus widens the realm in which conceptual engineering can be used
to choose analytic sentences. I apply these generalized conditions of ade-
quacy to a recent analysis of scientific theories and defend the relevance of
the analytic-synthetic distinction against criticisms byQuine, Demopoulos,
and Papineau.
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1 Two ways of naturalizing armchair philosophy
One motivation for naturalism in philosophy stems from the perceived gap
between the number of results in the sciences and in philosophy. Science has
achieved staggering successes in this respect, from enduring insights into the
nature of the cosmos to conveniences like digitized music to cancer treatments.
Philosophical insights, on the other hand, seem comparably fleeting (being
disputed by the next or even contemporary generation of philosophers), seldom
convenient, and even less often a matter of life and death.1 So maybe philosophy
can become better by being more like science, or one can show that philosophy
already is better than its reputation suggests because it already is very similar to
science. Either of these positions has been called ‘philosophical naturalism’.
Of course, not every similarity counts, as cargo-cult science shows (Feynman
and Leighton 1989, 308–317), and so the philosophical naturalist must choose
some features as particularly relevant. A proponent of ontological naturalism
chooses the content of philosophical theories, demanding that philosophy be
“concerned with the contents of reality, asserting that reality has no place for
‘supernatural’ or other ‘spooky’ kinds of entity”, where the spooky kinds are
typically those that are not condoned by science. A proponent ofmethodological
naturalism, on the other hand, “is concerned with the ways of investigating
reality, and claims some kind of general authority for the scientific method”
(Papineau 2009a).
In the following, I will focus on methodological naturalism. Typical argu-
ments for methodological naturalism assume that scientific claims are synthetic,
1. What counts as death may of course be a philosophical question. But this would be a matter
of ‘life’ and death’, or a matter of life and death (the concepts).
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that is, in some way about the world and thus factual. By establishing that philo-
sophical claims are also synthetic and depend on the same kind of support as
scientific claims (Papineau 2009b), one can conclude that philosophy and science
must rely on the same methods. (Experimental philosophy arguably comes into
play when one further assumes that the common philosophical methods are not
as effective as the scientific ones.)
Instead of pursuing this line of thought, I will in the following argue that
philosophical claims and a large number of scientific claims can be construed as
analytic, and specifically conventional, that is, suggestions for (typically new) con-
cepts rather than analyses of concepts we currently have. This means that sugges-
tions for philosophical concepts can be justified in the same way that suggestions
for scientific concepts can be justified, by what I will call ‘conceptual engineering’.
More specifically, I will argue that one can make a distinction between observa-
tional and non-observational claims and construe the non-observational claims as
analytic. Methodological naturalism then either claims that philosophy chooses
its analytic sentences the way the sciences do, or demands that philosophy choose
its analytic sentences so. Carnap (1963, iii.19), a paradigmatic armchair philoso-
pher, stated exactly this demand.
In the following, I will first give an overview of the assumptions of conceptual
engineering, with a focus on the role of empirical claims in the choice of analytic
statements (section 2). The assumption that analytic statements are true by con-
vention has important implications for the kind of argument that can be made for
the claim that conceptual engineering is central to science (section 3). But before
presenting this argument, I will discuss two attempts to establish the irrelevance
of conceptual engineering: Papineau argues that analytic sentences contribute al-
most nothing to the content of philosophical theories. His argument, however,
assumes Lewis’s semantics for theoretical terms, an assumption that is in direct
contradiction to those of conceptual engineering (section 4.1). Quine argues that
there is no point to the specific kind of conceptual engineering known as ‘expli-
cation’, but his argument simply overlooks the goal of explication (section 4.2).
That conceptual engineering plays a central role in the sciences has already been
supported by some empirical investigations (section 5.1) and either directly or in-
directly by some philosophical discussions of the sciences (section 5.2). I want to
add to these latter discussions and show how little needs to be assumed to be able
to introduce a distinction between analytic and synthetic components of scientific
theories (section 5.3). An argument by Demopoulos that was meant to establish
that under this distinction analytic sentences contribute more content to scien-
tific theories than is plausible succeeds in showing the extent to which analytic
sentences do so contribute, but fails to show that this is implausible (section 6).
Thus scientific theories can be construed as engaging substantially in conceptual
engineering, which allows for a methodologically naturalistic armchair philoso-
phy in Carnap’s sense.
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2 Conceptual engineering
Carnapian conceptual engineering relies on the idea that it is possible to deter-
mine whether a sentence can be empirically tested (Bradley, forthcoming, §§2–3).
It may be testable because the terms occurring in the sentence apply more or less
immediately to perceptions (cf. Chang 2005), but more generally, the sentence’s
terms simply refer to concepts that are uncontroversially applicable and thus
specifically not themselves under investigation (Reichenbach 1951, 49; cf. Lewis
1970, 428). These uncontroversial concepts I will call ‘basic concepts’, the terms
I will call ‘basic terms’, and the sentence build up from the terms and logical con-
stants I will call ‘basic sentences’. Controversial terms, concepts, and sentences
will be called ‘auxiliary’. Whether sentences containing only basic terms are true,
false, or indeterminate in their truth value can be determined by purely empirical
investigations (for instance by experiments) or formal investigations (for instance
bymathematical or logical proofs).2 The construction of basic sentences out of ba-
sic terms with the help of logical constants assumes that the logical constants are
uncontroversial. When they are not, one has to use basic sentences as primitives,
but fortunately, the following discussion can proceed taking logical constants as
uncontroversial.
Which concepts are basic is context dependent. In a dispute between two par-
ties, for instance, the basic concepts are those that both parties accept. If a concept
is challenged by either party, it becomes auxiliary. Such challengesmust stop at ob-
servation concepts, which are therefore always basic. Concepts are observational
if they can be learned by ostension, independently of one’s background.3 Quine
(1975, 316) puts it as follows: “The really distinctive trait of observation terms and
sentences is to be sought [ . . . ] in ways of learning. Observational expressions are
expressions that can be learned ostensively. They are actually learned ostensively
in some cases and discursively in others, but each of them could be learned by
sufficiently persistent ostension.” Observation concepts cannot be challenged be-
cause, as Przełęcki (1969, 36–38) points out, agreement on observation concepts
is a purely psychological phenomenon: Either one has learned the concept in
question or one has not; there cannot be a reasoned debate, only an empirical
check.
The testing of a claim involves an investigation of the truth of the basic sen-
tences it entails. If a sentence entails no basic sentences or only basic sentences
whose truth is indeterminate, then it can be chosen to be true, which makes the
sentence an analytic truth. A basic sentence with a determinate truth value, on
the other hand, can be analytic, synthetic, or a combination thereof. It is analytic
if its truth value follows from analytic basic sentences (which have been previ-
ously chosen to be true). It is synthetic if it is an observation sentence. It is a
combination of analytic and synthetic if its truth value follows from observation
2. For a formal exposition of this claim, see Lutz (2012a, §3).
3. Schurz (2014, 2.9.2) provides a detailed definition of ‘observation concept’ and Eberle (1990)
analyzes some of their logical aspects.
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sentences and analytically true sentences.4 Under this view of language, the only
possibility of assigning meaning to terms is through observation and convention.
I will follow (Przełęcki 1974, 402) and others in calling it ‘semantic empiricism’.
Within semantic empiricism, pure observation statements are, strictly speak-
ing, never analytic, but I will deviate slightly from this terminology in the follow-
ing: I will always assume that logical constants are are uncontroversial and call
sentences built up from observational terms and logical constants ‘observational’.
In this slightly deviant terminology there can thus be analytic observational sen-
tences, namely logical truths.
Of course, one can even choose the observational terms and in general the ob-
servational language, but as Eklund (2009, §2) points out, this choice of language
only leads to different ways of expressing the same propositions. The possibility
of such redescriptions does not have any interesting philosophical implications,
and I will ignore this aspect of language choice in the following.5
Two sets of sentences may entail the exact same basic sentences, in which
case they are often called ‘empirically equivalent’. I will reserve the term ‘observa-
tional equivalent’ for theories that entail the same observation sentences. Clearly,
empirically equivalent theories are also observationally equivalent.Within seman-
tic empiricism, the decision between two empirically equivalent theories is a mat-
ter of convention, as the correctness of the choice cannot be empirically tested
and thus cannot be observationally tested. Rather, the choice only determines a
convention about the use of the auxiliary terms.
The reason that the choice of convention is important is that, pace Lewis, it
is not redundant to speak of ‘arbitrary conventions’, for a convention is often
chosen with a specific goal in mind. That goal is often the accommodation of
specific facts (Kyburg 1990, 161–162). Consider a simple example: We might have
observed that some organism, when being interfered with in one of m ways,
{Di}1≤i≤m , reacts in one of n ways, {Aj }1≤ j≤n :
∀x
 ∨
1≤i≤m
Di x→
∨
1≤ j≤n
Aj x

. (1)
The question is now which new concepts should be introduced. One could, for
example, group all of the ways of interfering as ways of inflicting damage, D , and
4. Przełęcki (1969, ch. 10) provides a formal semantics for basic sentences build up from obser-
vation sentences in this way.
5. Unfortunately, Eklund goes on to claim that the language choices (or choices of “linguis-
tic frameworks”) that Carnap (1950) describes consist entirely of this trivial kind, even for non-
observational sentences. The alternative, Eklund (2009, 138) suggests, is that “a string of symbols
can come out true in some languages but false in others, while meaning what it actually means.”
But the Carnapian alternative is rather that the meaning of a string of symbols (the proposition it
expresses) is completely dependent on the choice of language, and that besides the propositions
expressed by observational sentences, there are no propositions to be expressed until the non-
observational sentences are chosen. In short: The only language-independent propositions are those
pertaining to observations. I thank André Carus for discussions of this point.
5
Sebastian Lutz Armchair Philosophy Naturalized—Preprint
group all of the ways of reacting as ways of showing avoidance behavior, A. This
would lead to
∀x
 ∨
1≤i≤m
Di x↔Dx

∧∀x
 ∨
1≤ j≤n
Aj x↔Ax

∧∀x(Dx→Ax) . (2)
But one might also consider the explicit definitions of ‘damage’ and ‘avoidance
behavior’ too restrictive, since one might later want to classify other kinds of
interference as damage (cf. Carnap 1936, 449) or one might later classify the or-
ganism’s reactions not only as avoidance behavior. To allow for this, one could
introduce a sufficient condition for damage and a necessary condition for avoid-
ance behavior:6
∀x
 ∨
1≤i≤m
Di x→Dx

∧∀x

Ax→ ∨
1≤ j≤n
Aj x

∧∀x(Dx→Ax) . (3)
One could also introduce ‘pain’, P , as an intermediary between the different kinds
of damage and avoidance behavior:∧
1≤i≤m
∀x(Di x→ P x)∧
∨
1≤ j≤n
∀x(P x→Aj x) . (4)
Finally, one could combine the previous two approaches, which seems to be clos-
est to the path that was chosen in ordinary language:
∀x
 ∨
1≤i≤m
Di x→Dx

∧∀x

Ax→ ∨
1≤ j≤n
Aj x

∧∀x(Dx→ P x)∧∀x(P x→Ax) . (5)
The reason one can choose between these different sentences is that they all entail
the same basic sentence (1), that is, all are empirically equivalent.
Finding empirically equivalent theories that are (or were) both actually used
in the sciences is more difficult then the pain example may make it seem since
finding appropriate conventions for the empirical results at hand is a difficult
task. So difficult, in fact, that the conventions have often been taken to be dis-
coveries. Nonetheless, a somewhat decent example may be the phlogiston theory
and the oxygen theory, which were empirically equivalent at least within a re-
stricted domain of application and until later auxiliary concepts were chosen that
connected to the oxygen concept but not the phlogiston concept. It seems that
most currently employed scientific theories that are empirically equivalent are
also equivalent in some stronger sense: For instance, they are also definitionally
6. The definitions of ‘damage’ and ‘avoidance behavior’ are weakened differently because of the
relation between the interferences and the reactions in the original observation: The mediators
between the interferences and the reactions must be necessary for the former and sufficient for the
latter.
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equivalent (Glymour 1970, 280) or there exists an equivalence between their cate-
gories of models that preserves empirical content (Weatherall 2016, §5). In general
it will also be rather difficult to identify empirically equivalent scientific theories
because it is difficult to distinguish between the empirical and the conventional
components of theories.
The reason that in the pain example above it is so easy to distinguish between
empirical and conventional statements is that the empirical statements are identi-
fied by their vocabulary: By assumption, only the different kinds of damage {Di}
and avoidance behavior {Aj } have a fixed, uncontroversial meaning, while the
newly introduced terms receive their meaning only through the sentences that
introduced them. This assumption is not essential: As already noted, one could
introduce basic sentences as a primitive as well, and I will discuss another way of
avoiding the assumption of a basic vocabulary in section 5.2. For now, however,
the restriction of the discussion to this simple case will suffice.
In the simple case, one can also find a simple answer to a question that is
in some sense the inverse to the question which concepts should be introduced:
If one is given a set of sentences Θ, what is the synthetic, observational compo-
nent of the set and what is the analytic, conventional component? Since this is by
assumption a simple case, the terms are bipartitioned into basic termsB and aux-
iliary termsA . Specifically, theB terms are assumed to be observational, that is,
everyB -sentence is synthetic. IfΘ is a finite set, it has only finitely manyB and
A terms and can be written as Θ(B1, . . . ,Bm ,A1, . . . ,An). Following a suggestion
by Carnap (1963, 24.c–d), one can express the theory’s synthetic component by
its Ramsey sentence
RB (Θ) := ∃X1, . . . ,Xn
∧
Θ(B1, . . . ,Bm ,X1, . . . ,Xn) (6)
and its analytic component by its Carnap sentence
CB (Θ) := RB (Θ)→
∧
Θ (7)
As I will discuss below, the Ramsey sentence entails all theB -sentences entailed
by Θ, while the Carnap sentence entails only tautological B -sentences. Since
furthermore the conjunction of Ramsey and Carnap sentences is equivalent to
Θ, they are plausible synthetic and, respectively, analytic components of Θ. (For
general B terms, the Carnap sentence is analytic, while the truth value of the
Ramsey sentence is uncontroversial.) As required and easy to prove, the Ram-
sey sentences of all the different sentences motivated by the empirical relation
between the interference with an organism and its reaction (1) are equivalent to
that empirical relation itself.
3 The argument at issue
The bulk of the following discussion is devoted to showing that the above descrip-
tion of the role of conceptual engineering in the sciences is correct. The coarse
7
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structure of the argument is as follows:7
1. A methodology that contributes essentially to the success of the sciences is
methodologically naturalistic.
2. The introduction of non-observational sentences into the sciences con-
tributes essentially to their success.
3. Non-observational sentences can be construed as being introduced into the
sciences by conceptual engineering.
4. Therefore, conceptual engineering can be construed as contributing sub-
stantially to the success of the sciences.
5. Therefore, conceptual engineering can be construed as being methodolog-
ically naturalistic.
Premise 1 is a modification of the definition of ‘methodological naturalism’ given
by Papineau (2009a). I added the demand that a methodology contribute essen-
tially because, as noted above, not every similarity to the sciences counts: Cargo-
cult sciences rely on methodologies that contribute to science’s success (e. g., the
use of journals, conferences, and citations), but these are not essential (Feynman
and Leighton 1989, 308–317). For an example with immediate relevance for con-
ceptual engineering, consider Papineau’s position that science uses analytic sen-
tences only for naming objects and properties that are already known to exist (Pa-
pineau 2009b, §iii). A methodology relying on the choice of analytic sentences
in Papineau’s sense would thus be a pure labeling exercise (see §4.1).
The empirical premise 2 is very weak because few if any sentences in the
sciences are purely observational. I take it that this premise is generally accepted
(see, e. g., Carnap 1939, §24; Tuomela 1973, §1.1). The two conclusions, I think,
follow analytically from the premises within the vagueness of natural language,
especially those of the modal operator ‘can be construed as’. This leaves premise 3
with that modal operator.
The modal operator does not appear in premise 3 as a cheap evasion of coun-
terarguments, but rather because the stronger claim that non-observational state-
ments are introduced by conceptual engineering is incompatible with the motiva-
tion of conceptual engineering given above. For themotivation relies on semantic
empiricism, and thus on the claim that every statement that is not observationally
testable is conventional, and therefore subject to conceptual engineering. This in-
vites the argument that this claim itself is not testable, and therefore conventional,
and therefore subject to conceptual engineering. (The argument is analogous to
the argument that the verification criterion of meaningfulness identifies itself as
7. This section is a response to and in significant parts inspired by the comments of an anony-
mous reviewer.
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meaningless, except that in this case, the criterion of conventionality identifies
itself as conventional.)8
One could reply that a criterion does not have to be applied to itself, especially
if the criterion applies to some object language and is phrased in the respective
metalanguage. This could get the conventionality criterion, which can be phrased
as a metalanguage claim, of the hook, but only on a technicality: The motivation
for the criterion, after all, is that we do not want to claim absolute, convention-
independent truth for statements that we cannot observationally test, and the
conventionality criterion cannot be observationally tested, metalanguage or not.
In other words, for each language, the motivation leads to a conventionality crite-
rion in the language’s respective metalanguage. Thus the modal operator ‘can be
construed as’ cannot be avoided on pain of flouting the motivation of conceptual
engineering: The operator expresses that premise 3 itself must be construed as
a product of conceptual engineering, and thus as dependent on the choice of a
language convention.
As used in the above argument, ‘conceptual engineering’ just means ‘language
choice as pursued in the sciences’. The rest of this paper is dedicated to showing
premise 3, that the sciences indeed can be construed as choosing their theoret-
ical concepts, rather than discovering them. Some of these arguments will be
empirical, some of them conceptual. The conceptual arguments will support the
stronger claim that it can be construed as being necessary that the sciences choose
their non-observational statements.
The conceptual arguments also apply to non-sciences and to philoso-
phy. However, they only establish that philosophy, insofar as it makes non-
observational claims, can be construed as engaging in language choice. The
demand that philosophy be methodological naturalistic amounts to the further
demand that philosophy choose its languages in the way the sciences do.
4 Papineau and Quine against conceptual engineering
There have been a number of criticisms of conceptual engineering as a method-
ology for philosophy, of which I will discuss a recent one by Papineau and a
particularly influential one by Quine.9
8. Whether the argument against the verification criterion succeeds is another matter, because
it might rely on a careless statement of the verification criterion. For the demand that every non-
analyticmeaningful statementmust be verifiable can also lead to the conclusion that the verifiability
criterion is analytic and, depending on one’s interpretation of ‘analytic’, conventional (Lutz 2017,
§§5–6).
9. The best known criticism of conceptual engineering comes from Strawson (1963) and has
been answered, to my mind successfully, by for instance Carnap (1963, §19) and Maxwell and Feigl
(1961).
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4.1 Papineau against conceptual engineering
Papineau (2009a, §2.1) argues that philosophy, like science, is about the world,
and thus best pursued naturalistically (cf. Papineau 2009b, 3). There are no dif-
ferences between the “aims and methods” of philosophy and science, but only in
the specific topics. Many philosophical theories are very general (e. g. theories of
“spatiotemporal continuants, universals and identity”), and
unlikely ever to be decided between by some simple experiment,
which is no doubt one reason that philosophers do not normally seek
out new empirical data. Even so, the naturalist will insist, such the-
ories are still synthetic theories about the natural world, answerable
in the last instance to the tribunal of empirical data.
What seems to identify [ . . . ] philosophical issues is that our
thinking is in some kind of theoretical tangle, supporting different
lines of thought that lead to conflicting conclusions. [ . . . ] Here
too empirical data are clearly not going to be crucial in deciding
theoretical questions—often we have all the data we could want, but
can’t find a good way of accommodating them. Still, methodological
naturalists will urge [that an] empirical theory unravelled from a
tangle is still an empirical theory, even if no new data went into its
construction.
One could construe philosophy like this: Somehow, the existing empirical data
force our hand and leave only one way out of the theoretical tangle. Of course, a
proponent of this view has the unenviable task of showing a way of empirically
testing the suggested solutions to the theoretical tangle, even though such tests
might not be simple. By contrast, the conceptual engineer construes philosophy
in a way that does not require this task: For the conceptual engineer, how to speak
about continuants, universals, and identity is not an empirical question, because
any answer is not testable and is thus a matter of choice. And if the unraveling of a
theoretical tangle in an empirical theory indeed cannot be decided by any further
empirical information, then it, too, is a matter of choice.10 That of course does
not mean that the theory in which the tangle occurred does not have an empirical
component. It just means that the problem could be solved without changing the
Ramsey sentence of the theory.
But Papineau (2009b, 9) has a counter to this reply: He argues that analytic
sentences are not interesting. Thus, since philosophy is interesting, conceptual
engineering cannot be philosophy. Using as an example a theory T with one
auxiliary term F , he argues that only the Ramsey sentence, which cannot be
changed by language choice, is philosophically interesting:
From the perspective of this approach to concepts, the original the-
ory T (F ) can be decomposed into the analytic Carnap sentence and
10. As noted, the choice can be better or worse, and the conceptual engineer claims that the best
choice is likely to be based on empirical results and made in the manner of the sciences.
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the synthetic “Ramsey sentence” of the theory—∃ΦT (Φ). The Ram-
sey sentence expresses the substantial commitments of the theory—
there is an entity which . . .—while the Carnap sentence expresses the
definitional commitment to dubbing that entity ‘F ’.
According to Papineau, if the Ramsey sentence of a theory is not changed, the
purported solution of some theoretical tangle can at best consist in the renaming
of concepts. For the Ramsey sentence of a theory states which auxiliary concepts
are actually realized, and the Carnap sentence only assigns them labels. But no
tangle has ever been solved by renaming alone. Thus the Carnap sentence is very
uninteresting (Papineau 2009b, 10):
[T]he natural assumption is surely that it is the synthetic Ramsey
sentences that matter to philosophy, not the analytic Carnap sen-
tences. What makes philosophers interested in investigating further
is the pretheoretical supposition that there are entities fitting such-
and-such specifications, not just the hypothetical specification that if
there were such entities, then they would count as free actions, or
intentional states, or whatever.
As an argument for the irrelevance of the Carnap sentence, Papineau’s argument
fails even on technical grounds. For the Carnap sentence in his example has the
form
∃ΦT (Φ)→ T (F ) , (8)
that is, the variable Φ in the antecedent is bound by the existential quantifiers,
and thus the F in T (F ) cannot refer back to Φ. This becomes obvious when
looking at the open formula T (Φ)→ T (F ), for it is not generally the case that
Φ and F have the same reference: F is interpreted by some structure A, but Φ is
interpreted by a variable assignment ν. For example, if T (F ) is the sentence F b ,
with b ∈ B and F ∈ A , then ∃ΦΦb , F b , and thus ∃ΦΦb → F b are true in A
with dom (A) = {1,2}, bA = 1, and F A = {1,2}, because A, ν  Φb for ν(Φ) = {1}.
But F A 6= ν(Φ).
Papineau probably does not have the Ramsey and Carnap sentences in mind
after all, for he introduces the above discussionwith the claim that “it is open to us
to regard the concept F as having its reference fixed via the description ‘the Φ such
that T (Φ)’. That is, F can be understood as referring to the unique Φ that satisfies
the assumptions in T , if there is such a thing, and to fail of reference otherwise”
(8). As Papineau (2009a, §2.3) states in a similar discussion, “the Ramsey sentence
corresponding to T (F ) is ‘∃!Φ(T (Φ))’”. But this is incompatible with Papineau’s
claim that the “original theory framed using the concept F is [ . . . ] equivalent
to the conjunction of the Ramsey and Carnap sentences” (Papineau 2009b, 9),
which is generally false if the Ramsey sentence is defined in Papineau’s way.
Take Papineau’s own example of a “simple theory of pain”, which is “con-
stituted by the two claims that (a) bodily damage typically causes pains, and (b)
11
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pains typically cause attempts to avoid further damage” (Papineau 2009b, 4). Sim-
plifying even more by ignoring the ‘typically’ and replacing causation by a mate-
rial implication, one gets
T (P ) := ∀x(Dx→ P x)∧∀x(P x→Ax) , (9)
with D , P , and A standing for ‘is damaged’, ‘feels pain’, and ‘shows avoidance
behavior’, respectively, andA = {P}. Then
∀x(Dx→Ax) a` ∀x(Dx→Dx)∧∀x(Dx→Ax) (10a)
a` ∃Y [∀x(Dx→ Y x)∧∀x(Y x→Ax)] (10b)
a` RB (T ) (10c)
and accordingly, from the definition of the Carnap sentence (7),
CB (T ) a` ∀x(Dx→Ax)→∀x(Dx→ P x)∧∀x(P x→Ax) . (11)
Note that this derivation can proceed purely syntactically, without any assump-
tions about the specific semantics involved. And it is easy to see that, indeed,
RB (T )∧CB (T ) a` T . On the other hand,
∃!Y T (Y ) ` ∃Y∀Z[T (Z)↔ Z = Y ] (12a)
` ∃Y∀Z[∀x[(Dx→ Zx)∧ (Zx→Ax)]↔ Z = Y ] (12b)
` ∃Y  ∀x[(Dx→ Y x)∧ (Y x→Ax)]↔ Y = Y ]
∧∀x[(Dx→Dx)∧ (Dx→Ax)]↔D = Y ]
∧∀x[(Dx→Ax)∧ (Ax→Ax)]↔A= Y ] (12c)
` ∃Y (D = Y ∧A= Y ) (12d)
` ∀x(Dx↔Ax) , (12e)
which is not entailed by T .11 Hence ∃!Y T (Y )∧CB (T ) is strictly stronger than
T .
In fact, Papineau has silently switched from the Ramsey sentence to some-
thing akin to the Ramsey-Lewis sentence, which led to the incompatibility. Lewis
(1970) introduces this sentence to allow for the explicit definition of all auxiliary
terms. To achieve this, Lewis (1970, 429) first assumes that all auxiliary terms
are constant names. By this assumption no “generality is lost, since names can
purport to name entities of any kind: individuals, species, states, properties, sub-
stances, magnitudes, classes, relations, or what not.” Thus all auxiliary terms can
be replaced by constant names since, as Lewis (1970, 429) states,B
provides the needed copulas:
11. Again, no assumptions about the semantics are required, and the proof does not even require
the extensionality of predicates.
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has the property
is in the state at time
has to degree
and the like.
Lewis (1970, 430) further assumes a logic in which constant names and definite
descriptions without denotations in the domain refer to the same distinguished
object. This object is not in the domain and thus lies outside of the scope of the
normal quantifiers. Therefore identities between denotationless constant names
or definite descriptions are true. On this basis, Lewis identifies the auxiliary terms
of a theory T (a1, . . . ,an) with definite descriptions. That is, for each auxiliary
term ai ,
ai = ιyi ∃y1 . . . yi−1yi+1 . . . yn∀x1 . . . xn
[T (b1, . . . , bm , x1, . . . , xn)↔ (y1 = x1 ∧ · · · ∧ yn = xn)] . (13)
Because of Lewis’s choice of logic, these equations can still be true even if the
definite descriptions occurring within them do not have unique referents in the
domain. For then the definite descriptions refer to the distinguished object (which
is not in the domain) to which the theoretical terms have to refer as well. Under
this assumption, and as is proper for definitions, the equations “do not imply any
[B ]-sentences except logical truths” (438).12
However, Lewis’s definitions of auxiliary terms typically do not follow from
the theory T , for T entails equation (13) only if T also entails
∃x1 . . . xn∀y1 . . . yn[T (y1 . . . yn)↔ y1 = x1 ∧ · · · ∧ yn = xn]
a` ∃!x1 . . . xn T (b1, . . . , bm , x1, . . . , xn) (14)
(Lewis 1970, 439). This is almost Papineau’s notion of the Ramsey sentence, ex-
cept that it does not involve higher order quantifiers and thus must rely on a
rewritten theory. Lewis (1970, 432–434) assumes that scientific theories aremeant
to entail the unique realization of their auxiliary terms. But this completely triv-
ializes the question of definability of theoretical terms: It is a condition of ade-
quacy for the definition of constant names that the formula defining the symbol
be uniquely realized (Hodges 1993, 59), and if the formula is uniquely realized,
it can be used as definiens of the constant symbol. Lewis’s assumption also com-
pletely trivializes the question of the possibility of conceptual engineering: If a
formula is uniquely realized, there is exactly one object to which the correspond-
ing theoretical term can refer; phrased in terms of properties, this means that
there is exactly one property to which the term can refer, and thus there is no
12. As Schurz (2014, 306) observes, the use of the distinguished object “is just a ‘formal trick’
which cannot avoid the result that Lewis definitions [ . . . ] do not determine the real reference of
theoretical terms in worlds in which [RB (T )] is false.” For one, any two definite descriptions or
terms without unique referents refer to the same object.
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choice of concepts whatsoever: Either the theory’s auxiliary terms refer to these
properties, or the theory is false.
As Papineau (1996, n. 4) expresses it, “we need to restrict the candidate refer-
ents for theoretical terms to natural properties or kinds, and exclude gerryman-
dered or gruesome entities.” Lewis’s rewriting of the theory so that auxiliary
terms are constant names masks this assumption.13 If there can be auxiliary predi-
cate symbols, the uniqueness condition could be enforced by explicitly restricting
quantification to natural predicates, which requires again a rewriting of the the-
ory:14 One could achieve the restriction by introducing the predicate ‘is a natural
kind’ for predicates, for instance. This, however, in effect requires giving up on
the Ramsey sentence because that predicate would also have to be treated as a
basic term, even though it is clearly controversial in a debate with conceptual
engineers (cf. Ainsworth 2009, §6).
Without rewriting the theory, the uniqueness assumption has consequences
that are clearly not meant to be entailed by scientific theories: In the case of Pap-
ineau’s simple theory of pain, the uniqueness condition entails that everyone in
pain shows avoidance behavior and everyone who shows avoidance behavior is
in pain. For real scientific theories the uniqueness assumptions has even more ab-
surd consequences—at least if, as is assumed, the auxiliary terms are introduced by
the theories themselves, so that the only postulates in which the auxiliary terms
occur are those of the theory. For instance, Simon (1970, §2) shows in his anal-
ysis of Ohm’s law that ‘voltage’ and ‘internal resistance’ can only be explicitly
defined by ‘resistance’ and ‘current intensity’ if there are at least two electric cir-
cuits. Under a uniqueness assumption, Ohm’s law therefore entails that there are
at least two electric circuits. Simon (1947, 901) also lays out that in Newtonian
particle mechanics, the component forces cannot be explicitly defined when a
system contains more than four particles. Under a uniqueness assumption, New-
tonian mechanics thus entails that there are at most four particles. The list could
go on.
Papineau’s argument for the irrelevance of the Carnap sentence thus either
begs the question or is not sound: If one assumes that the theories are rewritten
such that they fulfill the uniqueness condition, Papineau’s conclusion follows; but
it is based on assumptions that are explicitly denied by the conceptual engineer. If,
on the other hand, the theories are not rewritten, the assumption that it fulfills the
uniqueness condition is false. These are no idle technical considerations; rather,
they are the technical guise of the philosophical point that empirical results do
not determine new concepts, as seen in the simple theory about interference with
an organism and the organism’s reaction: There, very different auxiliary concepts
have been introduced, all with logically equivalent Ramsey sentences. These dif-
ferent options are all possible because the Ramsey sentence, unlike the Carnap
13. I thank Adam Caulton who went beyond the call of duty to make me understand this point.
14. This point holds independent of any semantic assumptions that go beyond the standard for-
malism of higher order deduction, because quantifiers of type t can be instantiated by any formula
of type t , even gerrymandered and gruesome ones.
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sentence, does not introduce new concepts. And for this reason the Carnap sen-
tence is conceptually interesting, even though it does not have empirical content.
4.2 Quine against conceptual engineering
Quine (1969) has given a highly influential argument for naturalism in epistemol-
ogy, which he develops as a reaction to Carnap’s preferred method of conceptual
engineering: explication, or, as it is also called, ‘rational reconstruction’ (Brun
2016). Quine distinguishes between the “doctrinal side” of traditional epistemol-
ogy (the attempt to justify all knowledge from sense experience) and its “con-
ceptual side” (the attempt to explain all our concepts in sensory terms) (Quine
1969, 71–74) and presents Carnap’s work Der logische Aufbau der Welt (Carnap
1928) as the most successful but still failed attempt at completing the conceptual
side of epistemology by defining all concepts in sensory terms. Quine (1969, 75)
identifies the Aufbau as an explicatory project, and wonders about the relevance
of explication:
But why all this creative reconstruction, all this make-believe? The
stimulation of his sensory receptors is all the evidence anybody has
had to go on, ultimately, in arriving at his picture of the world. Why
not just see how this construction really proceeds? Why not settle
for psychology?
Since this is a rhetorical question, Quine then proceeds to outline how psychol-
ogy should replace epistemology. Of course, the question could be asked of any
explication of a concept, including philosophical ones. Therefore this line of rea-
soning leads to a naturalization of all of philosophy.
The answer to Quine’s rhetorical question is clear, however: Explication can-
not be replaced by psychology because the goal of explication is not to find out
about the actual concepts that humans have, but rather to find new concepts
that are better than the actual concepts. A naturalized philosophy as described
by Quine, and indeed any naturalized philosophy that only determines which
concepts humans have, would only provide the first step of an explication (Lutz
2012a, §2.2): Getting clear about the concepts one wants to improve upon.
5 Conceptual engineering in the sciences
Concepts that have proven useful in ordering things easily achieve such an authority
over us that we forget their earthly origins and accept them as unalterable givens.
Thus they come to be stamped as “necessities of thought,” “a priori givens,” etc. The
path of scientific advance is often made impassable for a long time through such
errors. For that reason, it is by no means an idle game if we become practiced in an-
alyzing the long commonplace concepts and exhibiting those circumstances upon
which their justification and usefulness depend, how they have grown up, individu-
ally, out of the givens of experience. By this means, their all-too-great authority will
be broken. They will be removed if they cannot be properly legitimated, corrected
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if their correlation with given things be far too superfluous, replaced by others if a
new system can be established that we prefer for whatever reason.
Einstein (1916, 102), quoted by Howard (2015, §1)
[In Carnap’s Foundations of Logic and Mathematics (Carnap 1939), designata] are
admitted not only for concrete terms but also, in some cases at least, for abstract
symbols and expressions. [ . . . ] The reviewer would prefer a still more liberal admis-
sion of abstract designata, not on any realistic ground, but on the basis that this is
the most intelligible and useful way of arranging the matter—it would apparently
be meaningless to ask whether abstract terms really have designata, but it is rather
a matter of taste or convenience whether abstract designata shall be postulated.
(Church 1939, 822)
The original motivation behind explication in philosophy was already method-
ologically naturalistic. Carnap’s discussions very often rely on examples from the
sciences, and he explicitly states that “[p]hilosophers, scientists, and mathemati-
cians make explications very frequently” (Carnap 1962, §3). Hempel (1952, 664)
similarly states:
Explication is not restricted to logical and mathematical concepts
[ . . . ]. Thus, e. g., the notions of purposiveness and of adaptive behav-
ior, whose vagueness has fostered much obscure or inconclusive ar-
gumentation about the specific characteristics of biological phenom-
ena, have become the objects of systematic explicatory efforts. [ . . . ]
Similarly, the controversy over whether a satisfactory definition of
personality is attainable in purely psychological terms or requires
reference to a cultural setting centers around the question whether a
sound explicatory or predictive theory of personality is possible with-
out the use of sociocultural parameters; thus, the problem is one of
explication.
Accordingly, science is teeming with explicata, such as ‘temperature’ explicating
‘warm’ (Carnap 1950, §4; Hempel 1952, §10), and completely new terms like ‘phlo-
giston’, ‘oxygen’, ‘gene’, and ‘hydrochloric acid’, which were introduced to ac-
count for empirical results described in basic terms like ‘breathing’, ‘fire’, ‘child’,
and ‘dissolving’.15 I will argue that this view of scientific methodology is correct
using examples from empirical research and conceptual arguments.
5.1 Empirical arguments
Empirical investigations of scientific methodology have been done with increas-
ing rigor, and recent studies support the claim that science relies on conceptual
15. Schlick (1936, §i) analogously argues that Einstein arrived at his definition of ‘simultaneity’ by
amethod of concept formation that philosophers should follow. Unlike the later Carnap (1936, §15)
and Hempel (1952, §6), however, Schlick assumes that the method must lead to explicit definitions
of all terms in observation terms. I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out the relevance
of Schlick’s text.
16
Sebastian Lutz Armchair Philosophy Naturalized—Preprint
engineering. Chang (2004), for example, has given his investigation of the forma-
tion of the temperature concept the title Inventing Temperature, and concludes
on the basis of his investigation (206–208):
It is very tempting to think that the ultimate basis on which to
judge the validity of an operationalization should be whether mea-
surements made on its basis yield values that correspond to the
real values. But [an] unoperationalized abstract concept does not
correspond to anything definite in the realm of physical operations,
which is where values of physical quantities belong. [ . . . ] Once an
operationalization is made, the abstract concept possesses values in
concrete situations. But we need to keep in mind that those values
are products of the operationalization in question, not indepen-
dent standards against which we can judge the correctness of the
operationalization itself.
Thus there is no thing or property called ‘temperature’ in the world that is being
found out. Rather, scientists develop and in effect choose this concept.
In an overview of biological concept formation, Stotz (2009, §3, footnote and
reference removed) states that she and her colleagues
have come to appreciate that conceptual change in science is ratio-
nally motivated by what scientists are trying to achieve, by their ac-
cumulated experience of how to achieve it, and by changes in what
they are trying to achieve. [ . . . ] The gene concept is a case in point:
despite its ever-changing definition, the gene remains on the labora-
tory bench after a whole century because it has proved a flexible tool.
This only makes sense if we think of concepts as tools of research, as
ways of classifying the experience shaped by experimentalists to meet
their specific needs. Necessarily these tools get reshaped as the scien-
tists’ needs change.
In other words, scientists choose their concepts according to the concepts’ ex-
pedience. And specifically in biology, Stotz (2009, §4) comes to the following
conclusion:
It is simply that the molecular gene concept is not a good tool for
some kinds of research. The instrumental, Mendelian gene remains
the best tool in fields like medical genetics and population genetics.
So while a particular scientific concept reflects the scientific knowl-
edge at a point in time, this alone cannot explain the parallel use
of several different concepts. For a full understanding of that phe-
nomenon we need to see scientific concepts as tools for research, as
much as glassware, microscopes or scales.
This is exactly the conclusion that Carnap (1963, 938–939) draws: “A natural lan-
guage is like a crude, primitive pocketknife, very useful for a hundred different
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purposes. But for certain specific purposes, special tools are more efficient, e.g.,
chisels, cutting-machines, and finally the microtome.”
Thus there are good reasons to believe that some sciences, at least, rely on
conceptual engineering. Justus (2012, abstract) explicitly makes this connection.
On the basis of a case study of the concept of ecological stability, he argues that
Carnap’s theory of explication describes “how concepts should be characterized”.
5.2 Conceptual arguments
There are some explicit arguments for semantic empiricism, the view that terms
are assigned meaning through observation and convention. Rozeboom (1962),
for instance, gives an elaborate defense. Carnap (1966, 187–188) also argues that
any new concept of the scientific language (in my terminology: every auxiliary
concept) must be chosen. Thus the sciences are forced to engineer concepts in the
same way as philosophy:
Aworking physicist is constantly coming uponmethodological ques-
tions. What sort of concepts should he use? What rules govern these
concepts? By what logical method can he define his concepts? How
can he put his concepts together into statements and the statements
into a logically connected system or theory? All these questions he
must answer as a philosopher of science; clearly, they cannot be an-
swered by empirical procedures.
Unfortunately, Carnap leaves the categorical statement of the last sentence with-
out proof. But even so, it can be seen as a shifting of the burden of proof: To
defend the position that science discovers rather than invents concepts like tem-
perature and gene, one has to provide (and justify) an empirical procedure for
deciding whether a concept is correct.16
Other assumptions about the sciences establish only indirectly that the sci-
ences engage in conceptual engineering. In his argument for naturalized episte-
mology, Quine (1969, 81–82) concludes that “one has no choice but to be an
empiricist so far as one’s theory of linguistic meaning is concerned”. He argues
for the conventionality of language choice in the context of his argument for the
indeterminacy of translation:
[T]he linguist will end up with unequivocal translations of every-
thing; but only by making many arbitrary choices [ . . . ]. By this I
mean that different choices would still have made everything come
out right that is susceptible in principle to any kind of check.
16. In effect, Carnap here relies on the same argument that he uses to criticize metaphysics
(Bradley, forthcoming, §§2–3): If a sentence (like a sentence about the one correct meaning of
a term) cannot be empirically tested, it cannot be a statement of fact. It can, however, be a prag-
matically evaluable language suggestion (Lutz 2017, §6).
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Very little is in principle susceptible to any kind of check, since the “all incul-
cation of meanings of words must rest ultimately on sensory evidence” (Quine
1969, 75). With this claim of the observational equivalence of different language
choices, Quine provides pragmatic support for semantic empiricism, for even
if words could non-conventionally apply to unobservable things or properties,
whether they in fact do apply in a specific case must rely on observation.Without
semantic empiricism, this view renders the truth of non-observation statements
unknowable in principle due to lack of justification. Thus at a minimum,Quine’s
view entails that for all practical purposes, all non-observational concepts must
be chosen. Arguably, however, Quine’s position entails straightforward semantic
empiricism, since Quine (1951, 41) explicitly embraces conventionalism:
As an empiricist I continue to think of the conceptual scheme of
science as a tool, ultimately, for predicting future experience in the
light of past experience. Physical objects are conceptually imported
into the situation as convenient intermediaries—not by definition in
terms of experience, but simply as irreducible posits comparable, epis-
temologically, to the gods ofHomer. [ . . . ] Both sorts of entities enter
our conception only as cultural posits. The myth of physical objects
is epistemologically superior to most in that it has proved more effi-
cacious than other myths as a device for working a manageable struc-
ture into the flux of experience.
Since Quine here argues for choosing concepts the way the sciences do, he argues
for conceptual engineering.
Quine’s argument from the observational equivalence of alternative transla-
tions can be applied to other empiricist positions: In his constructive empiricism,
van Fraassen (1980, §1.3) argues that non-observable objects are inaccessible to sci-
ence, and thus science has to make do with empirical adequacy. The result is that
there is no scientific means of determining the applicability or non-applicability
of terms to unobservable objects (see Lutz 2014a, §3). As far as these objects are
concerned, science has to rely on convention. Thus the statements of both philos-
ophy and the sciences, whenever they go beyond observation, must be conven-
tions about language use.
Similarly, Sober (1990, 404) states that according to his position of contrastive
empiricism, “science is not in the business of discriminating between empirically
equivalent hypotheses”, where Sober considers theories empirically equivalent
if they assign the same probabilities to all observation statements. Therefore, in
particular the decision between two empirically equivalent theories with different
concepts is a matter of choice.
5.3 A new conceptual argument
In the following, I want to add a new conceptual argument, or rather: Weaken the
assumptions that are required for establishing a distinction between the analytic
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and the synthetic component of a theory Θ in the simple case that allows the
introduction of the Ramsey and the Carnap sentences. Carnap (1963, 23.d) argues
for the adequacy of the Ramsey sentence RB (Θ) as a theory’s synthetic (in my
terminology: uncontroversial) component σ and the Carnap sentence CB (Θ) as a
theory’s analytic (conventional) component α based on the following conditions
of adequacy for σ and α:
1. α∧σ Θ.
2. α entails only tautologicalB -sentences.
3. σ does not contain anyA -terms.
4. σ is empirically equivalent to Θ.
I will show that there is a way of generalizing these conditions of adequacy such
that they do not have to be restricted to the simple case in which basic sentences
are identified via their vocabulary. I will assume a full (Tarski) semantics of higher
order logic, as Carnap probably did as well (cf. Carnap 1956b, 43, 51, 62).
As first suggested by Caulton (2012), I will rephrase Carnap’s conditions on
sentences of the theory as conditions on the models of the theory: T := {A :A 
Θ}, A := {A :A  α}, and S := {A :A  σ}. Then the following model-theoretic
conditions of adequacy are (up to logical equivalent reformulations of the syn-
thetic component) equivalent to the ones suggested by Carnap (Lutz 2014b, §3.2):
1. A∩S= T
2. ∀A∃B ∈A :A|B =B|B
3. ∀A,B :A|B =B|B ⇒ (A ∈ S⇔B ∈ S)
4. ∀A : ∃B(B|B =A|B ∧B ∈ T)⇔∃B(B|B =A|B ∧B ∈ S)
Here ‘A|B ’ stands for the reduct of A to the B -vocabulary (Hodges 1993, 9).
Note that in condition 2 it is implicitly assumed that the universal quantification
ranges over structures of the right kind.17 That the first and second conditions
correspond to Carnap’s conditions follows directly from basic Tarski semantics.
The fourth condition demands that everyB -structure that is a reduct of a mem-
ber of T is also a reduct of a member of S and vice versa. Roughly: S and T have
the same reducts and are thus empirically equivalent. The third condition is the
most complicated one: It expresses that whether a structure is in the synthetic
component of a theory depends only on its reduct to theB -vocabulary, which
in turn means that the synthetic component does not restrict the interpretation
of the A -terms. Thus a sentence that is true in every structure of S must be
equivalent to a sentence that does not contain anyA -terms.
17. To be somewhat more precise, all the structures in the conditions are assumed to have the
same signature (Hodges 1993, 4–5).
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It is straightforward to prove that the models of the Ramsey and Carnap
sentences
S := {A :A  RB (Θ)}=

A :A|B ∈ T|B
	
A := {A :A  CB (Θ)}=

A :A|B 6∈ T|B ∨A ∈ T)
	
,
where T|B = {A|B : A ∈ T}, are adequate synthetic and, respectively, analytic
components of T according to the model-theoretic conditions of adequacy.
Themodel-theoretic formulation is easily generalized when one considers the
point of the reducts to the B -vocabulary: Two structures have the same reduct
if and only if they are empirically equivalent. What is important is thus the em-
pirical equivalence of structures A and B, which I will write as ‘A ∼B’. Then
the following abstract conditions of adequacy for A and S suggest themselves:18
1. A∩S= T
2. ∀A∃B ∈A :A∼B
3. ∀A,B :A∼B⇒ (A ∈ S⇔B ∈ S)
4. ∀A : ∃B(B∼A∧B ∈ T)⇔∃B(B∼A∧B ∈ S)
The overall class of structures could also be restricted to some class C, so that
T,A,S⊆C. Assuming that the equivalence relation ranges overC, that is,A∼B
only if A,B ∈C, the abstract conditions of adequacy do not have to be changed
at all if one again silently assumes that the universal quantification in condition 2
ranges over structures of the right kind: the members of C.
The previous model-theoretic conditions are a special case of these abstract
conditions of adequacy (where A ∼B if and only if A|B =B|B ). The abstract
conditions do not assume any specific language or any specific relation between
a vocabulary and empirical statements. All they assume is that it is possible to
determine when two structures are empirically equivalent, and this a very widely
shared assumption
The abstract conditions of adequacy can be applied in a particularly nice way
to a recent analysis of scientific theories: Andreas (2010, 538) develops a semantics
for scientific theories that is holistic, and claims that
it is rather misleading to construe relative holism as relying on the
analytic-synthetic distinction. This becomes evident in light of the
present account of semantic holism. In this account, only sentences
qualifying as postulates are assumed to determine the meaning of
theoretical terms. And the distinction between postulates and other
theoretical sentences must clearly not be equated with the analytic-
synthetic distinction. Analyticity is therefore no requirement for a
sentence to determine the meaning of nonlogical symbols.
18. The conditions are based on joint work with Adam Caulton.
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Since postulates can have both analytic and synthetic components, analyticity is
clearly no requirement for determining the meaning of terms. The interesting
question is, however, whether it is possible to distinguish between the analytic
and synthetic component of postulates. I will now show that Andreas’s account
allows for the introduction of an analytic-synthetic distinction and thus for the
conceptual engineering of the analytic component of theories.
Andreas (2010, 529–532) relies on a bipartition of the vocabulary into
B -terms that are observational and A -terms that are theoretical, i. e. non-
observational. Andreas (2010, 532) assumes a single intended B -structure AB
and a set U of unobservable objects, which are not inO = dom (AB ). mod(Θ) is
the set of models of the postulatesΘ, and ext(AB ,V ,U ) the set of expansions toV =B ∪A of the extensions of AB to O ∪U . In other words, ext(AB ,V ,U )
is the set of all structures B with domain O ∪U that have AB as a relativized
reduct. The relativized reduct of B to O and B is the restriction of the reduct
B|B to the domainO (cf. Hodges 1993, §5.1); I will write this asB|OB .19 These
concepts allow the following interpretation of the terms in V according to Θ
and AB (Andreas 2010, 533, my formulations)
Definition 1.
A∗(AB ) :=
mod(Θ)∩ ext(AB ,V ,U ) if mod(Θ)∩ ext(AB ,V ,U ) 6=∅
ext(AB ,V ,U ) if mod(Θ)∩ ext(AB ,V ,U ) =∅
(15)
AB combines empirical and conceptual information, because it assumes a
fixed empirical state of the world and determines what, for this specific state,
the interpretation of the auxiliary terms is. To express the interpretation of the
auxiliary terms for any state of the world, define
A :=
⋃
A∗(AB ) : dom (AB ) =O
	
. (16)
A contains the interpretations for each state of the world, since for any AB ,
ext(AB ,V ,U )∩A=A∗(AB ). Thus, informally, restrictingA to anyAB results
in Andreas’s semantics for AB . The previous expression (16) for A is equivalent
to (Lutz 2014b, §4.3)
A=

A : dom (A) =O ∪U ∧ (A|OB 6∈ T|OB ∨A ∈ T)
	
. (17)
This already looks like an analogue to the models of the Carnap sentence and
suggests a corresponding analogue to the Ramsey sentence:
S :=

A : dom (A) =O ∪U ∧A|OB ∈ T|OB
	
. (18)
To check whether these two sets are adequate analytic and synthetic components
of T, we need to determine the conditions of adequacy for Andreas’s semantics.
19. Hodges (1993, 202–203) defines relativized reducts as those substructures of a reduct that have
the extension of some one-place predicate as their domain. I use a slight generalization.
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Two structures A, B are empirically equivalent in Andreas’s semantics if and
only if they have the same relativized reducts to B and O, A|OB = B|OB .
Since Andreas restricts all structures to those with the domain O ∪ U , the set
C contains all and only structures with this domain. The abstract conditions of
adequacy then give:
1. A∩S= T
2. ∀A∃B ∈A :A|OB =B|OB
3. ∀A,B :A|OB =B|OB ⇒ (A ∈ S⇔B ∈ S)
4. ∀A : ∃B(B|OB =A|OB ∧B ∈ T)⇔∃B(B|OB =A|OB ∧B ∈ S)
All conditions are indeed fulfilled: The proofs for the first and fourth conditions
are straightforward. For the second condition, assume A ∈ C. Then A|OB ∈
T|OB or A|OB 6∈ T|OB . In the former case, there is someB ∈ T withB|OB =
A|OB . Since B ∈ T, it also holds that B ∈ A. The latter case is trivial. For the
third condition, assume A|OB = B|OB . A ∈ S if and only if A|OB ∈ T|OB ,
which holds if and only ifB|OB ∈ T|OB and thus if and only ifB ∈ S.
Thus the two sets of structures A and S fit with Andreas’s semantics and
are adequate analytic and synthetic components of the theory Θ. This gives an
indication of the generality of the abstract conditions of adequacy, since they
allow a distinction between the analytic and the synthetic components of theories
for a semantics that was explicitly developed under the assumption that such a
distinction may be impossible.20
In conclusion, Quine argues that the choice of language cannot be restricted
with the help of an observational test, van Fraassen argues that there is no epis-
temic access to the applicability of terms to unobservables, Sober argues that
science does not discriminate between observationally equivalent theories, and
Andreas’s semantics allows the distinction between an analytic and a synthetic
component of theories. In all these cases, then, scientific theories can be parti-
tioned into an observational component and a conventional component. How
extensive this conventional component is can be inferred from an argument due
to William Demopoulos.
6 Demopoulos against conceptual engineering
If not taken to simply beg the question against the conceptual engineer, Papineau
argues, in effect, that the Ramsey sentence of a set of postulatesΘ is so strong that
there is nothing left for the Carnap sentence to do besides the labeling of concepts.
20. There are in fact two more ways of introducing a distinction between the analytic and the
synthetic components of theories into Andreas’s semantics (Lutz 2012b, 58–60; Lutz 2014b, §4.3),
but the one presented here is the most general and seems to me the most natural.
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Demopoulos (2003, 2007, 2008) on the other hand argues that the Ramsey sen-
tence, withB as the set of observational terms andA as the set of theoretical,
non-observational terms, is too weak even to capture the synthetic content of a
theory.
In his first argument, Demopoulos (2003, 387) constructs an interpretation of
Θ’sA -terms given a single intendedB -structureAB . Given thatΘ is consistent,
Θ has a modelM, and he assumes that M = dom (M) has the same cardinality
as A = dom (AB ) without “any significant loss of generality or philosophical
interest”. Demopoulos (2003, 387, my notation) continues:
It is therefore possible to extend the partial interpretation [AB ] to
the theoretical vocabulary of Θ by letting each predicate of its theo-
retical vocabulary denote the image in A of its interpretation inM
under any one–one correspondence betweenM andA.21 For example,
suppose T is a binary theoretical relation of Θ. Then the interpreta-
tion T A of T inA is defined as the image under ϕ, ϕ one–one fromM
on to A, of its interpretation TM inM. Since by construction 〈a, b 〉
is in TM if and only if 〈ϕa,ϕb 〉 is in T A, ϕ is an isomorphism; and
therefore, ifM is a model of Θ, so is A.
This is false:22 What Demopoulos describes is a method with which, for any struc-
tureM and any bijection ϕ from M to a set A, ϕ can be used to define a struc-
tureB with domain A that is isomorphic toM. But there is no reason why the
reduct B|B of the resulting structure B should be identical to a specific partial
interpretation given by aB -structure AB with domain A. As a simple example,
choose the B -structure AB with A = {1,2} and OAB = {〈1,1〉}, and theory
Θ = {∀xy(Oxy ↔ T xy)}.23 Demopoulos now claims that for any model M
of Θ and any bijection ϕ from M to A, the mapping of the extension TM to A
by ϕ provides an extension that can be used in a expansion of AB to a model
of Θ. So choose M = {a, b} and OM = TM = {〈a, b 〉}. Then M  Θ. But B
with B|B = AB and TB = {〈ϕa,ϕb 〉} is not a model of Θ under any bijection
ϕ :M −→A (let alone all bijections), because ϕa 6= ϕb , while Θ and AB require
that TB = {〈1,1〉}. ϕ is an isomorphism fromM|A toB|A , but not fromM to
B.
Demopoulos (2003, 387–388, my notation) goes on to criticize the Carnap
sentence, since it entails that Θ is true whenever Θ’s Ramsey sentence is true:
Call the interpretation of Θ’s A -vocabulary in A that we have just
described ‘AA ’ [:= A|A ]. Any theory of knowledge and reference
21. Here and in the following, the original text does not distinguish between a structure and its
domain (referring, for example, to the “the image in A of its interpretation in M under any one–
one correspondence between M and A”). The distinction in my notation thus has to be taken as
an interpretation of the quote.
22. Wagner (2009) was the first to criticize Demopoulos’s proof, although the following argu-
ment differs from his.
23. Note that AB has an expansion to a model of Θ.
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that is incapable of distinguishing truth from truth underAA is com-
mitted to the implication that Θ is true if Θ is true under AA . But
modulo our assumption about cardinality, thatΘ is true underAA is
a matter of model theory. AA is arbitrary; the construction which
employs it is clearly unacceptable, since it trivializes the question
whether Θ is true. [ . . . ] By equating truth with truth under AA we
rob our knowledge of the truth of our theoretical claims of its a pos-
teriori character: modulo a single assumption about cardinality, the
theoretical statements of an empirically adequate theory come out
true as a matter of metalogic.
Given the problem with Demopoulos’s construction of AA , the criticism is too
strong. The last quoted sentence states that if a theory is empirically adequate
(that is, it entails only true B -sentences), then it is true. The claim that AA is
arbitrary, however, would only be true if AB were arbitrary as well, and that is
not the case. In the counterexample given, T AA = T A is fixed completely by AB
and the explicit definition of T by O that is given in Θ.
In his other arguments against the Carnap sentence, Demopoulos (2008, 376–
377; 2011, 186–187) starts from a technical observation in first order logic (van
Benthem 1978, lemma 3.2): For anyB -structure AB , if allB -sentences entailed
by Θ are true in AB , then there exists an expansion of an elementary extension
of AB that is a model of Θ. This trivially entails that there exists an expansion
of an extension of AB that is a model of Θ, and in Tarski semantics this entails
that RB (Θ) is true in an extension of AB . (If the basic sentences are assumed to
be of higher order, this result is trivial, for then RB (Θ) itself is a basic sentence
entailed by Θ.)24
Demopoulos’s conceptual point is the following (Demopoulos 2008, 377): If
the Carnap sentence of Θ is taken to be an analytic truth, then the truth of Θ
follows analytically from the truth of the basic sentences entailed by Θ—modulo
a cardinality assumption (and in higher order logic without this assumption).
This is correct. However, Demopoulos (2008, 381) further argues that the Carnap
sentence
is incapable of accurately representing the truth of theoretical claims
because it takes their truth to collapse into satisfiability in a suffi-
ciently large domain. This is hardly what we take the truth of theo-
retical claims to consist in, since we characteristically—and rightly—
distinguish them from those of pure mathematics. A reconstruction
which fails to acknowledge this, is not merely odd, it misses what is
arguably one of the chief desiderata of an adequate philosophy of the
exact sciences.
24. In this argument, Demopoulos (2011, 187) also mentions an arbitrary mapping function (like
ϕ in the previous argument), but restricts it to the objects that are newly introduced by the ele-
mentary extension of AB . Thus the arbitrariness of the interpretation of the theoretical terms is
restricted to objects that are newly introduced by the elementary extension.
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This conclusion is again too strong, for mathematical claims typically differ sig-
nificantly from theoretical claims according to the Carnap sentence. For one,
the truth of mathematical claims does not depend on the truth of any empirical
claims, while the truth of theoretical claims does. Extending the above example,
define Θ′ :=Θ ∪ {∃xy T xy}. Then CB (Θ′) a` ∃xy Oxy→Θ′, so that the truth
of any theoretical claim of Θ′ depends on the B -sentence ∃xy Oxy being true.
This is in stark contrast to mathematical claims. Furthermore, as the original ex-
ample already shows,A -terms can differ significantly from mathematical terms
in that they may be explicitly definable inB -terms. Finally, note that Demopou-
los starts from the bare intuition that there must be something more substantial
to scientific theories than only their empirical implications and their conventions.
But this stance only contradicts the basic idea of semantic empiricism, without
providing an argument.
Since Demopoulos’s argument fails to show anything wrong with taking
RB (Θ) as the empirical content of Θ, his results can be turned around: They
show how much in a theory is a matter of convention. Possibly modulo a cardi-
nality assumption, the conceptual apparatus of a theory can be chosen at will, as
long as theB -sentences come out true.
7 Some implications
Both artificial language philosophy and science can be construed as relying on lan-
guage choice, at least as far as choices between empirically equivalent sentences
are concerned. Thus philosophical language choice can be practiced like language
choice in the sciences and thus be naturalistic. In this way, the application of scien-
tific methods to solve philosophical problems escapes Kim’s criticism that a natu-
ralized epistemology loses the normative component of traditional epistemology
(Kim 1988). According to Kim, epistemology determines what, for instance, jus-
tification should be, while, say, psychology only determines how people think
about justification. But when relying on conceptual engineering, scientists, like
philosophers, can develop a new concept called ‘justification’ that is fruitful in
their research. And since this new concept is suggested, its development has a nor-
mative component.
Since in conceptual engineering analytic claims are typically suggested with
the goal of accommodating specific facts, one can draw a number of tentative
further conclusions. For one, the distinction between a priori and a posteriori
claims is not particularly helpful: It is true that concepts could be suggested with-
out any empirical input, but the resulting concepts are likely to be useless. The
reason that we have the concept momentum, for instance, is that the product of
mass and velocity is conserved. If it were not, there would be no reason to use
the concept momentum, any more than there would be a reason to use a concept
for the product of mass and age divided by the number of us presidents. This,
I think, also defuses those of Quine’s criticisms of analyticity that rely on the
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idea that analytic sentences are true “come what may” (cf. Richardson 2003, 8):
Analytic sentences are not the most certain of all sentences, they are rather the
most malleable. And they are not held true come what may, but rather given up
in response to empirical results.
Since the sciences rely on language conventions whenever they go beyond
observational claims, most entities and properties referred to by scientific theo-
ries (for instancemomentum) are introduced rather than discovered. According to
methodological naturalism, philosophy then can also introduce entities and prop-
erties, and indeed should introduce them if their introduction is well-motivated.
But this goes against ontological naturalism, which demands that philosophy not
introduce properties or entities not condoned by the sciences. Thus, somewhat
surprisingly, ontological and methodological naturalism are in tension.
Finally, if the sciences and philosophy are both involved in conceptual en-
gineering, this allows for the cooperation between science and metaphysics, be-
tween science and ethics, and between science and aesthetics, for instance (Lutz
2012a, §5). So one of the paradigmatic armchair philosophies can fulfill natural-
ized philosophy’s promise of a strong cooperation between the sciences and phi-
losophy without rendering philosophy superfluous or subservient to scientific
results. For conceptual suggestions in the sciences are, prima facie, on a par with
conceptual suggestions in philosophy. Their adoption is justified, but not forced,
by their usefulness.
References
Ainsworth, Peter M. 2009. “Newman’s Objection.” The British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science 60:135–171.
Andreas, Holger. 2010. “Semantic Holism in Scientific Language.” Philosophy of
Science 77 (4): 524–543. doi:10.1086/656007.
Bradley, Darren. Forthcoming. “Carnap’s Epistemological Critique of Meta-
physics.” Synthese. doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1335-x.
Brun, Georg. 2016. “Explication as a Method of Conceptual Re-engineering.”
Erkenntnis 81:1211–1241. doi:10.1007/s10670-015-9791-5.
Carnap, Rudolf. 1928. Der logische Aufbau der Welt. Berlin-Schlachtensee:
Weltkreis-Verlag. References are to the translation (Carnap 1967).
. 1936. “Testability and Meaning.” Philosophy of Science 3 (4): 420–468.
. 1939. Foundations of Logic andMathematics. I:139–213. Foundations of the
Unity of Science. Toward an International Encyclopedia of Unified Science 3.
Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. References are to the two-
volume edition.
27
Sebastian Lutz Armchair Philosophy Naturalized—Preprint
Carnap, Rudolf. 1950. “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology.” Revue Interna-
tionale de Philosophie 4:20–40. References are to the slightly modified reprint
(Carnap 1956a, appendix A).
. 1956a. Meaning and Necessity. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
. 1956b. “The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts.” In The
Foundations of Science and theConcepts of Psychology and Psychoanalysis, edited
by Herbert Feigl and Michael Scriven, 1:38–75. Minnesota Studies in the Phi-
losophy of Science. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
. 1962. Logical Foundations of Probability. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
. 1963. “Replies and Systematic Expositions.” In Schilpp 1963, 859–1016.
. 1966. Philosophical Foundations of Physics: An Introduction to the Philos-
ophy of Science. Edited by Martin Gardner. New York and London: Basic
Books, Inc.
. 1967. The Logical Structure of the World. Pseudoproblems of Philosophy.
Translated by Rolf A. George. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of Cal-
ifornia Press.
Caulton, Adam. 2012. “Theoretical Analyticity, Revisited.” Talk presented at the
2012Annual Conference of the British Society for the Philosophy of Science, Uni-
versity of Stirling, 5 July 2012.
Chang, Hasok. 2004. Inventing Temperature: Measurement and Scientific Progress.
Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Science. New York: Oxford University
Press.
. 2005. “A Case for Old-fashioned Observability, and a Reconstructed
Constructive Empiricism.” Philosophy of Science 72 (5): 876–887. doi:10.1086/
508116.
Church, Alonzo. 1939. “Review: Rudolf Carnap, Foundations of Logic and Mathe-
matics.” Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 45 (11): 821–822.
Demopoulos, William. 2003. “On the Rational Reconstruction of our Theoreti-
cal Knowledge.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54:371–403.
. 2007. “Carnap on the Rational Reconstruction of Scientific Theories.”
In The Cambridge Compation to Carnap, edited by Michael Friedman and
Richard Creath, 248–272. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
. 2008. “Some Remarks on the Bearing of Model Theory on the Theory
of Theories.” Synthese 164 (3): 359–383. doi:10.1007/s11229-008-9355-1.
28
Sebastian Lutz Armchair Philosophy Naturalized—Preprint
Demopoulos, William. 2011. “Three Views of Theoretical Knowledge.” The
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science: 177–205. doi:10.1093/bjps/axq021.
Eberle, Rolf. 1990. “Classification by Comparison with Paradigms.” American
Philosophical Quarterly 27 (4): 295–304.
Einstein, Albert. 1916. “Ernst Mach.” Physikalische Zeitschrift 17:101–104.
Eklund, Matti. 2009. “Carnap and Ontological Pluralism.” In Metametaphysics:
New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, edited by David Chalmers, David
Manley, and Ryan Wasserman, 130–156. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Feynman, Richard P., and Ralph Leighton. 1989. “Surely You’re Joking, Mr. Feyn-
man!” Adventures of a Curious Character. Edited by Edward Hutchings. New
York: Bantam Books.
Glymour, Clark. 1970. “Theoretical Realism and Theoretical Equivalence.”
Edited by Roger C. Buck and Robert S. Cohen, (Dordrecht), Boston Studies
in the Philosophy of Science, no. VIII: 275–288.
Hempel, Carl G. 1952. Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Sciences.
Vol. II,7. Foundations of the Unity of Science. Toward an International En-
cyclopedia of Unified Science. Chicago and London: University of Chicago
Press. References are to the two-volume edition.
Hodges, Wilfrid. 1993. Model Theory. Vol. 42. Encyclopedia of Mathematics and
its Applications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Digitally printed
in 2008.
Howard, Don A. 2015. “Einstein’s Philosophy of Science.” In The Stanford En-
cyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2015, edited by Edward N. Zalta. Stanford:
The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language and Infor-
mation, Stanford University.
Justus, James. 2012. “Carnap on Concept Determination: Methodology for Phi-
losophy of Science.” European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (2): 161–179.
doi:10.1007/s13194-011-0027-5.
Kim, Jaegwon. 1988. “What Is “Naturalized Epistemology”?” Philosophical Per-
spectives 2:381–405.
Kyburg, Henry E. 1990. “Theories as Mere Conventions.” In Savage 1990, 158–
174.
Lewis, David. 1970. “How toDefineTheoretical Terms.”The Journal of Philosophy
67 (13): 427–446. doi:10.2307/2023861.
Lutz, Sebastian. 2012a. “Artificial Language Philosophy of Science.” European
Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (2): 181–203. doi:10.1007/s13194-011-0042-
6.
29
Sebastian Lutz Armchair Philosophy Naturalized—Preprint
Lutz, Sebastian. 2012b. “Criteria of Empirical Significance: Foundations, Rela-
tions, Applications.” PhD diss., Utrecht University. http://philsci-archive.
pitt.edu/id/eprint/9117.
. 2014a. “Generalizing Empirical Adequacy I: Multiplicity and Approxi-
mation.” Synthese 191:3195–3225. doi:10.1007/s11229-014-0440-3.
. 2014b. “The Semantics of Scientific Theories.” InKsięga pamiątkowaMar-
ianowi Przełęckiemu w darze na 90-lecie urodzin, edited by Anna Brożek and
Jacek Jadacki, 33–67. Lublin: Nobertinum. Authoritative preprint: http://
philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9630.
. 2017. “Carnap on Empirical Significance.” Synthese 194:217–252. doi:10.
1007/s11229-014-0561-8.
Maxwell, Grover, and Herbert Feigl. 1961. “Why Ordinary Language Needs Re-
forming.” The Journal of Philosophy 58 (18): 488–498.
Papineau, David. 1996. “Theory-Dependent Terms.” Philosophy of Science 63 (1):
1–20.
. 2009a. “Naturalism.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring
2009, edited by Edward N. Zalta. The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for
the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University.
. 2009b. “The Poverty of Analysis.”Aristotelian Society Supplementary Vol-
ume 83 (1): 1–30. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8349.2009.00170.x.
Przełęcki, Marian. 1969. The Logic of Empirical Theories. Monographs in Mod-
ern Logic Series. London/New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul/Humanities
Press.
. 1974. “On Model Theoretic Approach to Empirical Interpretation of
Scientific Theories.” Synthese 26:401–406.
Quine, Willard Van Orman. 1951. “Two Dogmas of Empiricism.” The Philosophi-
cal Review 60 (1): 20–43. doi:10.2307/2181906.
. 1969. “Epistemology Naturalized.” In Ontological Relativity and Other
Essays, 69–90. The John Dewey Essays in Philosophy 1. New York and Lon-
don: Columbia University Press.
. 1975. “On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World.” Erkenntnis
9:313–328.
Reichenbach, Hans. 1951. “The Verifiability Theory of Meaning.” Proceedings of
the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80 (1): 46–60.
30
Sebastian Lutz Armchair Philosophy Naturalized—Preprint
Richardson, Alan W. 2003. “Logical Empiricism, American Pragmatism, and the
Fate of Scientific Philosophy in North America.” In Logical Empiricism in
North America, edited by Gary L. Hardcastle and Alan W. Richardson, 1–
24. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 18. Minneapolis, MN:
University of Minnesota Press.
Rozeboom, William W. 1962. “The Factual Content of Theoretical Concepts.”
In Scientific Explanation, Space, and Time, edited by Herbert Feigl, Michael
Scriven, and Grover Maxwell, 3:273–357. Minnesota Studies in the Philoso-
phy of Science. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Savage, C. Wade, ed. 1990. Scientific Theories. Vol. 14. Minnesota Studies in the
Philosophy of Science. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Schilpp, Paul Arthur, ed. 1963. The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. The Library of
Living Philosophers 11. Chicago and LaSalle, IL: Open Court Publishing
Company.
Schlick, Moritz. 1936. “Meaning and Verification.” The Philosophical Review 45
(4): 339–369.
Schurz, Gerhard. 2014. Philosophy of Science. A Unified Approach.New York, NY,
and London: Routledge.
Simon, Herbert A. 1947. “The Axioms of Newtonian Mechanics.” Philosophical
Magazine 38 (7).
. 1970. “The Axiomatization of Physical Theories.” Philosophy of Science
37:16–26.
Sober, Elliott. 1990. “Contrastive Empiricism.” In Savage 1990, 392–410.
Stotz, Karola. 2009. “Experimental Philosophy of Biology: Notes From the
Field.” Studies In History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (2): 233–237.
Strawson, P. F. 1963. “Carnap’s Views on Constructed Systems versus Natural
Languages in Analytic Philosophy.” In Schilpp 1963, 503–518.
Tuomela, Raimo. 1973. Theoretical Concepts. Library of Exact Philosophy 10.
Wien: Springer.
Van Benthem, Johann. 1978. “Ramsey Eliminability.” Studia Logica 37:321–336.
Van Fraassen, Bas C. 1980. The Scientific Image. The Clarendon Library of Logic
and Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Wagner, Pierre. 2009. “Carnap’s Rational Reconstruction of Theories and New-
man’s Argument.” Talk presented at the EPSA 09, Amsterdam, October
2009.
31
Sebastian Lutz Armchair Philosophy Naturalized—Preprint
Weatherall, James Owen. 2016. “Are Newtonian Gravitation and Geometrized
Newtonian Gravitation Theoretically Equivalent?” Erkenntnis 81 (5): 1073–
1091.
32
